{"published_count":667,"discovered_count":673,"count":1,"cves":[{"cve_id":"CVE-2026-72693","title":"Local privilege escalation in openvt via incorrect process owner verification allowing passwordless root login","description":"`openvt -u` is intended to identify the owner of the current VT and then execute `login` as that user from a privileged context. In the documented `kbrequest`/init usage, the ownership test in `authenticate_user()` relies on `stat(\"/proc/<pid>/fd/0\")`. `stat()` on `/proc/<pid>/fd/0` follows the symlink to the underlying TTY device node. As a result, `buf.st_uid` reflects the owner of the TTY node rather than the owner of the process holding the file descriptor. If the TTY owner returns to `root` or the getty owner after logout while an unprivileged process still has `fd 0` attached to that TTY, the check can incorrectly treat that process as belonging to the privileged console owner. Once that check succeeds, the `-u` path executes a passwordless login as the selected user. In the documented `kbrequest`/init deployment using `openvt -us`, this can result in passwordless `login -f root` on the spawned VT. This report establishes that privilege escalation path for that documented deployment; it does not claim equivalent reachability for deployments that do not use `openvt -u` from a privileged `kbrequest`/init path.","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.8,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","cwe":"CWE-284","product":"openvt","reference_count":2,"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-72693","published":"2026-08-11"}]}